Been in the Storm Too Long, without Redemption: What We Must Do Next Essay by Fair, Bryan K.
Alabama Law Scholarly Commons 
Essays, Reviews, and Shorter Works Faculty Scholarship 
1997 
Been in the Storm Too Long, without Redemption: What We Must 
Do Next Essay 
Bryan K. Fair 
University of Alabama - School of Law, bfair@law.ua.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_essays 
Recommended Citation 
Bryan K. Fair, Been in the Storm Too Long, without Redemption: What We Must Do Next Essay, 25 S.U. L. 
Rev. 121 (1997). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_essays/11 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Alabama Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Essays, Reviews, and Shorter Works by an authorized 
administrator of Alabama Law Scholarly Commons. 
ESSAYS
BEEN IN THE STORM TOO LONG,
WITHOUT REDEMPTION: WHAT WE MUST
DO NEXT
© BRYAN K FAIR*
INTRODUCTION
A. Making History
As Southern University Law Center marks fifty years and
celebrates its legacy as one of only four remaining accredited
historically black law schools, I am honored to share this es-
say with its supporters throughout the tumultuous years since
its founding.' Despite its tribulations, Southern Law Center has
thrived, reshaping the Louisiana judiciary with its fine, capable
graduates. It is my sincere hope that Southern Law Center will
flourish during the next century. However, that future is uncer-
tain in light of the current political climate, most notably the
vituperative assault on the civil rights gains for Americans of
* Professor of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law. B.A., Duke Uni-
versity, 1982; J.D., UCLA School of Law, 1985. All rights reserved. I wish to thank
Dean Ken Randall, the Alabama Law School Foundation, and especially, the Edward
Brett Randolph Fund for financial support for research on this essay. I also owe an
enormous debt to my colleagues for creating an intellectually challenging environ-
ment Finally, Patty Nelson continues to provide the most able assistance.
1. Black law schools emerged in the United States during the separate but equal
century following the Civil War as whites were forced by litigation either to open pub-
lic schools on a nonracial basis or to build separate facilities for blacks. Many states,
including Louisiana, chose the latter, creating law schools like Southern University in
1947. Another prevalent practice was for states to pay out-of-state tuition costs for
blacks to attend law school in other states at schools that admitted blacks until the
Court held that such procedure was a denial of equal protection. See Missouri ex
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938). For an incisive discussion of the growth of
black public schools, see Gil Kujovic, Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and
the Black Public College: The Era of Separate But Equal, 72 MINN. L Rsv. 29 (1987);
for a related discussion on the establishment of black law schools, see Denise Wal-
lace-Haymore, Black Law Schools: The Continuing Need, 16 S.U. L REv. 249 (1989).
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color achieved since the 1960s. More precisely, no advance-
ment for Americans with darker skin is safe given the way
many commentators and judges trivialize the history of racial
inequality in the United States and recent false comparisons
between our past and present.
Unfortunately, one of the great ironies of education in the
United States is that few Americans learn anything about ra-
cial inequality and current racial caste. Consequently, most
Americans are blind to racial privilege, never thinking about
racism as a compelling national problem. If we are to make
progress in the next century, we must meet this significant ed-
ucational challenge, teaching more Americans about our sor-
did history.
This educational function is one of the great contributions
that schools like Southern University Law Center have made
and must continue to make. Because of its unique history,
Southern Law Center is well situated to teach the world about
America's racist legacy and to help lead the United States out
of its current racial quagmire. This is so because Southern
knows both the degradation of exclusion from Louisiana State
University, as well as the necessity for educational institutions
like Southern that are not hostile to students of color. South-
ern understands that because of America's segregative past,
schools like LSU will never recreate safe, nurturing environ-
ments like the one at Southern. So rather than close or merge
Southern Law Center, I hope that all the people of goodwill in
Louisiana will recognize Southern's vital teaching role and pro-
vide it with more support so that it can become an even
greater beacon of educational excellence, open to all.
B. Healing Wounds Through Community
Looking to the next century, I am reminded of the pro-
phetic words attributed to Pastor Martin Niemoller who, writ-
ing about the Nazis, said,
In Germany they came first for the Communists, and I didn't
speak up because I wasn't a Communist. Then they came for
the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then
they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up be-
cause I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the
Catholics, and I didn't speak up because I was Protestant Then





I do not expect a reversal in the severe retrenchment in civil
rights protection unless more Americans embrace one another
as community across the traditional divides of race, gender,
religion, sexual orientation and class, recognizing within each
other the ways in which we have been privileged and the ways
we have been subordinated.
Specifically, as black folk, this means recognizing in-
traracial privilege and subordination, as well as the tendency
of some of us to act on attitudes that disparage others on the
basis of race, gender, religion or sexual orientation, for exam-
ple. We need a new Black Power that serves to eliminate our
racial caste, but one that also helps us build community
among others who experience caste differently. We must listen
to each other's stories, acknowledging, as Stephanie Wildman
brilliantly explains, that "attacking privilege alone cannot end
subordination, because systems of privilege regenerate the dis-
criminatory patterns that maintain the existing hierarchies of
oppression."3 Put differently, we need a power to persuade
others that no person has a constitutional right to maintain
caste over others in the United States. At bottom, we must see
that those who interpret our laws do so in a way that permits
efforts by government to eliminate every vestige of caste, root
and branch.4
C. Curing the Disease
As the child of one of this nation's black ghettoes, I am
quite fortunate to have escaped poverty and a potential life of
crime. As one of America's racial caste babies, I know that too
many Americans have lived a fairy tale, denying the reality of
racial privilege and the presumed property value of being clas-
2. For one version of the quote, see Exn. m THE FATEER-LANiD. LETrERs FROM
MoABIT PRISON (Hubert Locke ed., 1986). Niemoller formed the Pastors' Emergency
League to resist the Nazi takeover of church life. As an outspoken preacher against
the regime, he spent eight years in Nazi prison camps. See also THE OXFORD DIcTIoNARY
OF WORLD RELGIONS 699 (John Bowker ed., 1997); JAMES BENTLEY, MARTIN NlMiOLLER
(1984).
3. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REvEALED: How lNvIsILE PREFERENCE UNDER-
MINES AMERICA 28 (1996).
4. The Court implied this anti-caste doctrine in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 494 (1954), adopting a constitutional interpretation consistent with Justice
John Marshall Harlan's dissents in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 558 (1896), and
the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,71 (1883).
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sified as white, male persons. Why else would color or gender
matter? Those socially constructed categories, whiteness and
maleness, have meant despair for so many nonwhite, nonmale
Americans. Hereafter, my focus is racial caste, saving for an-
other discussion a fuller discussion of other forms of Ameri-
can caste.
Theories of racial supremacy have poisoned the American
well for too long. It was racial privilege for whites and racial
subordination of colored Americans that animated Justice
John Marshall Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson;5 it was
racial caste against colored children that galvanized a unani-
mous Court in Brown v. Board of Education.6 Governmental
policies or devices that have the purpose or effect of treating
some citizens as second-class persons--creating or extending
their caste-violate the equal protection principle. On the
other hand, government policies designed to eliminate caste or
subordination do not run afoul of the Constitution. Indeed, the
Constitution mandates them. The current United States Su-
preme Court majority is misguided, rejecting this fundamental
distinction between caste-producing legislation and policies de-
signed to eliminate caste. Therefore, in race matters, the prob-
lem of the Twenty-first century will be the problem of color-
blindness-the refusal of legislators, jurists, and most of
American society-to acknowledge the causes and current ef-
fects of racial caste and to adopt effective remedial policies to
eliminate them.
My thesis is that this Court is dismantling recent constitu-
tional and federal statutory decisions the way its predecessor
did during Reconstruction.7 The best hope to reverse this mod-
em civil rights retreat is new appointments to the Court,
which now seem unlikely before the next presidential election
in 2000. We must insist that new Court appointees understand
the difference between advancing racial supremacy and elimi-
nating racial caste.
Beyond the Court's membership, another challenge is the
Court's perverse, ineffectual interpretation of the equal protec-
tion clause, construing it against historically disfavored minori-
5. 163 U.S. 537, 558 (1896).
6. 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954).
7. Between 1873 and 1896, the Supreme Court emasculated the Civil War
Amendments and related civil rights laws. BRYAN K FAi, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE
BABY: COLOR BLINDNESS AND THE END OF AFFtRmATIVE ACTION 96-103 (1997).
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ties. One reason we have lost so much ground is because the
Court has returned to the definition of equality captured in
Plessy, while, at several turns, explicitly undermining the anti-
caste meaning of Broum. We cannot concede this interpretive
ground; we need to define equality in a consistent, substantive
way that aids traditionally disfavored persons in their efforts
to eliminate their caste.
My proposal is to read the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause as a prohibition on states from placing any
person or group into a or maintaining any person's or group's
caste on the basis of animus to some arbitrary characteristic
such as race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, poverty, or
disability. That clause's meaning should not be contingent,
hinging on the axis of discrimination. Rather, the clause's
meaning must be determinate.
Finally, as the winter closes on remedial affirmative ac-
tion, whether in voting, employment, or education, we must
reassert its legal and moral defenses at every opportunity.8 Re-
medial affirmative action has none of the invidious attributes
that defined the United States as a white country, privileging
persons who could claim a white racial ancestry. Today, no
job category is closed to whites, no college/university excludes
whites from enrollment solely on the basis of race, and no vot-
ing devices are designed to keep whites from the polls, deny-
ing or diluting their votes. Neither American legal nor public
policy is anti-white, as they have been decidedly anti-black.
The purpose of this essay is to strip bare the current
Court majority's masterful dissection of the principal, too-
short-lived, civil rights gains realized during the past thirty
years. Tragically, a majority of the current Supreme Court has
turned its back on its most caste-vulnerable constituents in re-
cent decisions that all but forbid remedial action in education,
voting, and employment. I dissent to this attack on the consti-
tutional rights of those who for too long have been forced to
wait for justice. Part I addresses more fully shortcomings of
the current Court. Part II examines how this Court's activist
interpretive methodology portends great harm to America's
perennial outsiders. Finally, Part Ill contains a personal assess-
8. I offer an unequivocal defense of remedial affirmative action in NoTES OF A
RAciAL CASTE BABY. FAIR, supra note 7, at 115-75.
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ment of remedial affirmative action, explaining why I am an
unequivocal defender.
PART I
THE COURT OF LAST RESORT
Our first problem is the Court itself. It is the Court's prov-
ince and duty to say what the Constitution means 9 and nothing
precludes the Court from interpreting the equality provision as
an anti-caste clause, that is, nothing save its current member-
ship. This Court is the product of Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and
Bush appointments, and it illuminates effectively why it mat-
ters who is elected President and why we must vote. When
Democrats lost the White House in 1972, 1980, 1984, and 1988,
they also lost the Court. Republicans control Congress and the
Supreme Court, even though a Democrat is President.
In Appendix A,'0 I have organized the votes of each cur-
rent justice in many of the principal affirmative action cases
since 1978. The results illustrate a stark pattern of hostility by
five current justices to claims for racial remediation and jus-
tice, leaving this writer wondering whether, at the close of this
century too, the Court has not again become an agent of the
same racial supremacy so clearly ensconced in Plessy.
William Rehnquist," who was appointed to the Court by
Nixon in 1971, is the most senior justice, in terms of years of
service. As Chief Justice, he is in the enviable position of run-
ning the Court, including, when he is in the majority, of as-
signing opinions to the other justices. By all counts, Rehnquist
is a constitutional conservative who usually has read the Con-
stitution narrowly when minority persons have challenged re-
strictions on their rights. Rehnquist has been aided by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, and often, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor,
to re-write the meaning of many significant constitutional deci-
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
10. In Appendix A, I set out the voting record of each of the current justices in
14 affirmative action cases since Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978). Only Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616
(1987), was not a race case. The justices have displayed a remarkable consistency for
or against remedial policies. See infra Appendix A.
11. For brief profiles on current and former justices, see THE OXFORD COMPANON
TO THE SUPREME CouRT (Kermit L Hall ed., 1992).
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sions, including, for example, Brown, Gomillion v. Lightfoot,'2
and Fulilove v. Klutznick. 3 Rehnquist has never recognized
the difference between remedial affirmative action and invidi-
ous racial discrimination, voting against the traditionally-
disfavored minority interest in all the significant affirmative ac-
tion cases since Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.14
Next in seniority is John Paul Stevens, who was appointed
by Ford in 1975. Ideologically, Justice Stevens has traveled the
farthest of all the current justices in terms of his judicial opin-
ions on remedial affirmative action. In early affirmative action
cases in education and employment, Justice Stevens routinely
voted against the remedial programs as violations of equal pro-
tection.'5 Yet, today he believes, as I do, that there is an impor-
tant constitutional difference between policies that promote
white supremacy and policies designed to eliminate it.' Equal-
ity, then, does not mean that everyone is always treated identi-
cally; context matters, a remedial context is not the same as a
demeaning one. Government intent is important because only
invidious purposes or methods violate constitutional interests.
This important contextual distinction has been a cornerstone
of constitutional jurisprudence, frequently used by the Court
to tell minorities they had not proved intentional, purposeful
discrimination. Today, Stevens usually votes in favor of reme-
dial programs aiding traditionally-disfavored minority
persons.
7
Sandra Day O'Connor joined the Court in 1981, fulfilling a
campaign promise from Reagan to appoint the first woman to
the Court. When Justice O'Connor graduated law school very
near the top of her class, the best job offer she obtained was
as a legal stenographer.'8 Her story is similar to that of mil-
lions of white women who were excluded from America's
12. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
13. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
14. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). See also infra Appendix A.
15. See, for example, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and F-
lilove, 448 U.S. at 532-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. Adarand Constrs., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 242-64 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
17. Appendix A reveals that Stevens has voted for remedial afrmative action in
10 of the 14 cited cases. See infra Appendix A.
18. KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INvSmiLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AmERicA
1638 TO THE PRzs.ENT 194 (1986).
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promise, not by inability, but by caste-producing, gender pref-
erences for men, who were relieved of any requirement to
compete with half the population. For women of color, at least
one other axis of discrimination relegated them to a racialized
sub-caste, excluding them from limited opportunities available
to their white sisters. Nonetheless, O'Connor has displayed a
remarkable misunderstanding of the purposes of remedial af-
firmative action, especially in race cases. Justice O'Connor is
chiefly responsible for the artful destruction of FuUilove and
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC,'9 as well as Gomi//ion. Although
O'Connor claims strict scrutiny review is necessary to distin-
guish legitimate from nonlegitimate governmental uses of race,
she has voted against remedial race-based affirmative action,
never finding a compellingly justified, narrowly-tailored plan.2°
In 1986, while Democrats slept, Reagan fortified Republi-
can domination of the Court, appointing Rehnquist, Chief Jus-
tice, and Antonin Scalia to Rehnquist's old seat. Foreshad-
owing his opinions, Justice Scalia once wrote an article
condemning remedial affirmative action in which he asserted
that his father had come to this country as an immigrant and
had never earned a dime off the sweat of a black man. There-
fore, Scalia concluded, affirmative action was unfair to inno-
cent whites like him.21 Of course, what he and other benefi-
ciaries of white privilege ignore is that for much of its history,
U.S. immigration law privileged whiteness, explicitly limiting
naturalization to persons classified as white until 1870.22 As
the current Court member who most often takes readers on a
journey through American history and tradition in the states,
Scalia has ignored America's long history of officially privileg-
19. 497 U.S. 547, 602-31 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
20. See infra Appendix A. The one exception to O'Connor's consistent voting
pattern against affirmative action was in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa
Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), a gender affirmative action case brought by a
white male against a white female.
21. Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure, WAsH. U. LQ 147, 152 (1979). Even if
one opposes remedial affirmative action, Scalia's defense of his father is misplaced.
The fact is that the sweat of millions of black men and women helped build this na-
tion, affording millions of European immigrants a better place to come. One does not
need to have owned slaves or to have sponsored segregation to benefit from those
systems of racial privilege.
22. IAN HANEY LOPEZ WHrlT BY LAW (1996) (chronicling racial bias in U.S. natural-
ization rules). For an insightful reader on anti-immigrant policies, see IMMIGRANTS OUT:




ing whiteness until only thirty years ago. Today, Justice Scalia
privileges whiteness through opinions that in substance dis-
patch blacks to modem lives under Jim Crow-like subordina-
tion to whites. Scalia is unwilling to eliminate racial caste, al-
ways voting against remedial race-based affirmative action.23
Anthony Kennedy, Reagan's final appointment, joined the
Court in 1988, after the failed Robert Bork and Douglas Gins-
burg nominations. Justice Kennedy has been difficult to pre-
dict, sometimes joining the Court's conservative bloc to curtail
Congress' power, but other times breaking with it to insist that
the state not improperly aid religion. To his credit, Kennedy
wrote the Court's opinion in Romer v. Evans,24 the landmark
decision forbidding Coloradans from treating gays or lesbians
as second-class citizens. That opinion reflects an anti-caste in-
terpretation of the equal protection clause. Nonetheless, Jus-
tice Kennedy does not analyze racial caste claims through the
same lens. This is especially remarkable since the clear pur-
pose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to prevent whites
from keeping blacks in caste conditions. With Justice
O'Connor, Kennedy's vote has been pivotal in affirmative ac-
tion litigation. It is impossible to prevail without the vote of
one of them.
25
David Souter was appointed to the Court by Bush in 1990.
Souter may be a huge disappointment to Republicans, but for
me he is almost the perfect justice, usually writing about the
Constitution as Earl Warren, Thurgood Marshall, and William
Brennan did; it is not a set of empty words. As much as any
other current Justice, he has eschewed partisan views and em-
braced precedent as worthy of respect, even when he has dis-
agreed with it. Souter writes well-reasoned opinions and one
never gets the feeling that he is pulling the wool over one's
eyes.26 Souter recognizes the difference between policies ad-
vancing racial supremacy and ones designed to dismantle it.27
23. See infra Appendix A.
24. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
25. See infra Appendix A. Since Croson, Kennedy has regularly voted against re-
medial affirnative action.
26. For example, in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 679-87 (1993) (Souter, J., dis-
senting), Souter provides a persuasive review of voting rights precedent that reveals
the majority's claim that Gomillion was controlling was simply wrong and inconsis-
tent with another case with more similar facts.
27. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 264-71 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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We all recall the agonizing Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas
hearings, and Thomas' narrowest appointment to the Court by
Bush in 1991. Groomed by Reagan and Bush handlers, Thomas
was moved strategically from the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission, to the D.C. Court of Appeals, and to the Su-
preme Court. Despite Bush's claims otherwise, Thomas was
not the most qualified African American to replace Thurgood
Marshall. That assertion was an insult to Marshall and at least
a couple dozen other black federal judges who had far longer
tenure than Thomas in law generally and on the bench specifi-
cally, but they had the wrong ideological stripe. 2 Justice
Thomas votes against affirmative action, always.29 I suspect
that is chiefly why Bush wanted him there. From all indica-
tions, Thomas is intent on undermining Marshall's legacy.
In 1993, Clinton appointed Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the
Court. Justice Ginsburg has remained a consistent champion
of gender equality. She was the principal advocate or on brief
in most of the significant gender discrimination cases before
the Court between 1971 and 1980 when she was appointed a
federal judge by Carter.3° In most race and gender cases, she
has sided with those justices who interpret the Constitution to
permit the elimination of caste, including through remedial af-
firmative action. Like Souter, Justice Ginsburg is one of the
least partisan of all the current justices. She rejects colorblind-
ness theory, embracing instead a contextualized meaning of
equality that is substantive, not formalistic.:"
Clinton chose Stephen Breyer to replace retiring Justice
Harry Blackmun in 1994. In the Rose Garden ceremony where
Breyer was introduced to the nation, Breyer said, "I will cer-
tainly try to make the law work for the people, because that is
its defining purpose in a government of the people."32 For Jus-
tice Breyer, the phrase 'the people' seems to include all Ameri-
cans, including those at the bottom of America's economic and
28. According to the ABA Judicial Division, there are some 1,680 black judges in
the United States, many on state supreme courts or on the federal bench. See Tim Di-
RECrORY OF MiNoRrrY JUDGEs OF THE UNrTED STATES (2d ed. 1997).
29. See infra Appendix A.
30. For articles about Ginsburg, see Stephanie B. Goldberg, The Second Woman
Justice: Ruth Bader Ginsburg Talks Candidly About a Changing Society, KBA J.
Oct 1993, at 40; Deborah L Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's Work to
Change the Law, 11 WoMEN's RTs. L REP. 73 (1989).
31. See, for example, Adarand, 515 U.S. at 271-75 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
32. Jeffrey Rosen, Even Stepen, NEw R wuuc, June 6, 1994, at 11.
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political well. I am encouraged that Breyer has joined Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg, justices who view the Constitution as a
living, breathing document, one that can do for equality and
the elimination of caste what it once did so fully for inequality.
Justice Breyer has supported remedial affirmative action, not-
ing its continuing need given our tragic history.
A few other general observations can be made. This is a
young Republican Court: six justices are under age 65 and
have been appointed since 1986. Most of the current justices
will likely remain on the Court for the next decade. At 50,
Clarence Thomas is the youngest member, potentially remain-
ing on the Court beyond the first quarter of the Twenty-first
century. Like Rehnquist, who was appointed to the Court in
his forties, in time, Thomas could find his way to the position
of Chief Justice. Can you imagine the Court led by Thomas?
For me, that is a frightening thought.
The real strength of the Court is in an elusive, unpredict-
able middle group among Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. More precisely, Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor are in the center of two other groups, with their
swing votes producing numerous devastating 5-4 or 6-3 deci-
sions against minorities over the past several terms.
In race-based remedial affirmative action cases, there is a
sharp 5-4 split against, sending civil rights groups scrambling
to avoid any more losses there.3 This fear and despair are ap-
propriate if, as I argue below, this Court has set out two
proof-of-discrimination standards, one for white plaintiffs like
Sharon Taxman, and another more rigorous standard for plain-
tiffs of color.
PART II
THE CouRT's WAR AGAINST CIVIL RIGHTS
A second problem is this Court majority's tendency to
write opinions that reverse significant, hard-won civil rights
gains, while barely citing relevant historical context or prece-
dent.34 This Court has abandoned the initiatives started just
33. Consider Piscataway v. Taxman, 91 E3d 1547 (1996), cert. dismissed, 139 L
Ed. 2d 431 (1997), for example, where civil rights groups proposed a financial settle-
ment of Taxman's lawsuit rather than endure this Court's review on the merits.
34. Two significant recent examples of this sidestepping of precedent are found
19971
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over thirty years ago, dismantling those legal victories of the
1960s and 1970s in the same way that its predecessor gutted
the Civil War Amendments and federal civil rights statutes dur-
ing the late Nineteenth century.3 Indeed, the parallels to the
post-Reconstruction Court portend the emasculation of the
1964 Civil Rights Act3 and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.3
The principal difference between then and now is that to-
day not only are we embattled with a revisionist Court, we
also have a Congress that is intent on ending remedial affirma-
tive action. In July 1997, a House subcommittee approved
along party lines the 1997 Civil Rights Act which would abol-
ish federal affirmative action programs. Although the House
Judiciary Committee has tabled the bill until 1998, at last
count there were ninety Republican co-sponsors.8 Republi-
cans, controlling Congress and the Court, have declared war
against remedial affirmative action.
Using rhetoric of federalism, equal opportunity, and color-
blindness, the current Court majority has run from precedent
and turned its interpretive power against citizens who have
only in the last generation begun to live the "American
Dream." This Court writes too often as if race discrimination
never happened in the U.S. or that it occurred so long ago that
nothing can or should be done about it. Thus, Justice Thomas
tells us government cannot make the races equal; it can only
recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law.-
Similarly, Justice Scalia writes that in this country there is
only one race-American. 4°
For the current Court majority, the Constitution cannot do
for equality what it has done for inequality. Under such think-
ing, this Court has abandoned the schoolchildren that it prom-
in the Court's opinions in Adarand which failed to reconcile the earlier decision in
Puiilove, as well as Shaw which was written as if the Court had not faced a similar
claim in United Jewish Organizations.
35. The parallels between 1872-1896 and 1973-1997 are remarkable. The current
Court is rereading modem civil rights statutes and reinterpreting constitutional provi-
sions against the very persons the revised laws were designed to protect, just as the
post-Reconstruction Court did a century ago in its repudiation of the Civil War
Amendments and related federal civil rights laws.
36. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1975a to 1975d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (West 1997).
37. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1971, 1973, 1973a to 1973p (West 1997).
38. U.S.LW., 2294 Nov. 18, 1997.
39. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring).
40. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ised to protect in Brown.41 The same five justices have de-
cided that in most situations it is illegal to create majority-
minority voting districts, where race is the predominant factor
used to create the district.42 A third area of retrenchment is in
modem affirmative action. There, Justice O'Connor has dis-
played a shocking insensitivity to race-based remedial policies,
implying that there is no constitutional difference between pol-
icies designed to eliminate racial caste and those which pro-
mote white supremacy.43
Consider the Court's education cases. The Court has all
but abandoned its mandate to desegregate schools or to pro-
mote educational diversity. Today the Court has lost the mean-
ing of Brown and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education." Brown was a command to eliminate dual educa-
tional systems, a superior one for whites and an inferior one
for minorities, entirely. It held that segregated schools placed
black children in a caste, stigmatizing them in ways likely to
ever be undone. Such publicly sponsored caste was inherently
unequal, violating the equal protection clause.45 Regrettably,
the Court did not state directly the connection between white
supremacy and segregation, but Brown's implicit meaning is
unmistakable. For me, Brown meant that policies promoting
racial supremacy were unconstitutional. Swann was a belated
order to recalcitrant school officials, who for almost twenty
years thumbed their noses at the Constitution, to adopt deseg-
regation plans that would work immediately.46
Now, twenty-five years later, we still have many segre-
gated schools throughout the country and unequal educational
opportunity. Nonetheless, in Oklahoma City v. Dowell,47 Rehn-
quist has set out a new test for ending district court supervi-
sion: whether the school board had complied in good faith
with the court order since it was entered and whether the ves-
tiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent
practicable. Reminiscent of the "all deliberate speed" proviso
41. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 98-101 (1995).
42. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 91-19 (1995).
43. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223-37.
44. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
45. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-95.
46. Swann, 402 U.S. at 13.
47. 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991).
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in Brown II,48 DoweU reveals that the Court will no longer
force school officials to prove much at all.
Moreover, in Freeman v. Pitts,4 the Court held that a dis-
trict court is permitted to withdraw judicial supervision with
respect to discrete categories in which a school district has
achieved compliance with a court-ordered desegregation plan.
Justice Kennedy's opinion clarified DoweU by listing specific
factors to examine before relinquishing supervision.50 These
standards are important because once federal authority is dis-
missed, plaintiffs must initiate costly new lawsuits, rather than
simply petition the court for a hearing. They must also pre-
sumably meet the difficult burden of showing invidious, pur-
poseful discrimination.
Finally, in Missouri v. Jenkins,5' the Court held that the
remedial power of the federal court does not extend to orders
to fund salary increases or remedial education programs,
where student achievement levels remained below national
norms at many grade levels. Unlike Swann, Jenkins cabins
federal court remedial power narrowly, to eliminating the iden-
tifiable vestiges of the de jure segregation, to the extent practi-
cable. Thus, these new cases release school districts from the
evidentiary burdens established in Brown.
The Court's mandate today is not desegregation, but re-
storing local control quickly. Therefore, no matter what
schools look like, as long as no one can prove resegregation is
the result of invidious discriminatory intent, local school offi-
cials can do whatever they want, leaving Brown as essentially
meaningless.
This Court's record in recent voting cases is no less retro-
gressive, reflecting the same ahistoric, revisionist confusion
found in recent education cases. Historically, the Court had
identified two types of voting rights claims-deprivation or di-
lution. Either a plaintiff was prevented from voting entirely-
through a device such as a grandfather clause, poll tax, liter-
acy test, or white primary-or districts were drawn to reduce
minority strength. For example, in Smith v. AUright52 and
48. Brown, 349 U.S. at 301.
49. 503 U.S. 467, 491-92 (1992).
50. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491-92.
51. 515 U.S. 70, 98-101 (1995).
52. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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Terry v. Adams,53 blacks could not vote in the primary, the
only election that mattered. The primary was opened to mem-
bers of the Jaybird Democratic Organization, which only
whites could join. Also, in Gomillion, all but a half dozen of
the 400 black residents of Tuskegee were gerrymandered out
of the municipality and excluded from voting.54
In other voting cases, minority plaintiffs challenged legis-
lative districting, alleging that districts were shaped and sized
to minimize the impact of minority voting. For example, in
Reynolds v. Simms,55 the Court reminded us that the right to
vote can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizen's vote as effectively as by wholly prohibiting its
free exercise. The Court held the right to vote can neither be
denied outright, nor can it be destroyed by alteration of bal-
lots, nor diluted by ballot-box-stuffing. 56 Reynolds guaranteed
one person one vote. After the decision, the Alabama Legisla-
ture could no longer apportion one Senate seat for 15,000 per-
sons and another for 600,000. Districts had to be roughly the
same size numerically.
In Shaw v. Reno,57 the Court created a novel voting rights
claim, requiring no proof of invidious discriminatory injury.
None of the plaintiffs in Shaw claimed either an abridgement
or a dilution of their voting rights. Instead, they claimed that
their rights had been violated essentially because they were
placed in a majority-minority district-a majority black dis-
trict. What was the constitutional harm alleged in Shaw? That
the new district was so strange-looking, so ill-shaped, that, on
its face, it had no explanation save as an effort to separate
voters on the basis of race.58 Of course, when Hasidic Jews
made the same claim fifteen years earlier in United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey,59 the Court told them they had not as-
serted an equal protection claim °
Shaw is another example of the Court's deceptive compar-
ison of cases out of context. The only point that GomiU ion
53. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
54. 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960).
55. 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).
56. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555.
57. 509 U.S. 630, 659 (1993).
58. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 659.
59. 430 U.S. 144, 162-68 (1977).
60. United Jewish Orgs., 430 U.S. at 162-68.
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and Shaw shared was a reference to race in drawing a district
line. The motives for using race and the consequences follow-
ing its use were completely different. Under Shaw, any separa-
tion of voters by race is invidious, despite the motives or re-
sults. This interpretation, of course, makes an inquiry into
motives redundant and unnecessary, implicitly rewriting the
Court's holdings in cases such as Washington v. Davis61 and
Arlington Heights v. MDH@2 where the Court said that to
prove discrimination, plaintiffs had to show evidence of pur-
poseful, invidious conduct by the government. Is it possible
that the current Court majority applies one standard for mi-
nority plaintiffs, but a different standard for white complain-
ants? It is difficult to reconcile Shaw and its progeny
otherwise.
Since Shaw, majority-minority districts in Florida, North
Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas have all been invali-
dated under this modem racial gerrymander theory.6 A Shaw-
plaintiff presents an equal protection claim if he establishes
that race was the predominant factor motivating the legisla-
ture's decision to place a significant number of voters in or
outside a particular district.6 Obviously, in any case where a
legislature intentionally creates a majority-minority district, the
Shaw/Miller standard will be met. So, in my mind, majority-mi-
nority districts are presumptively unconstitutional for at least
five current justices. This result turns voting rights history
against minority groups seeking to elect the candidate of their
choice. It makes it much easier for white plaintiffs to chal-
lenge majority-minority districts. As bad, it opens the door to a
direct constitutional challenge to the role of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) in voting cases. The Court has told the DOJ it
cannot force states to maximize the number of majority-
minority districts.6 The next step is a rereading of the Voting
Rights Act itself, already suggested by Justice Thomas. 6
61. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
62. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
63. The Court's recent decisions since Shaw v. Reno have effectively taken the
Court out of its role of protecting minority voting rights. See, e.g., Hunt v. Shaw, 517
U.S. 899 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S.
737 (1995).
64. See Mil/er, 515 U.S. at 915-16.
65. See id. at 921-22




Here, I think the Court has given those of us interested in
a more racially diverse national legislature no alternative but
to challenge selected majority-white districts under the Shaw
standards. Our challenge is to show that race has been as pre-
dominant a factor in creating majority-white districts as it is in
creating recent majority-minority districts. Even though I do
not expect the Court to recognize these proposed claims, such
challenges would accomplish several valuable results, includ-
ing testing my hypothesis that the Court applies different
proof standards for plaintiffs advancing minority interests.
PART I
AFFRMATIVE ACTION AND ME
The final area that I want to mention briefly is afflimative
action. The road from Bakke to Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, was tortuous, with numerous closely divided Court opin-
ions. Bakke rejected quotas, but embraced promoting educa-
tional diversity as a compelling interest. Adarand does not
overrule Bakke, but it reveals this current Court majority's dis-
dain for race-based affirmative action and its disregard for pre-
cedent. How will this Court decide the next educational diver-
sity case? Is Bakke still the controlling case? How does it
operate in areas where lower federal courts have announced
different standards? Can the Fifth Circuit, for example, reverse
Bakke? The Court's recent affirmative action cases have cre-
ated more uncertainty than they have resolved.
More than a collection of cases, however, affirmative ac-
tion is personal for many of us and we must share our sto-
ries.67 I was born, the eighth of ten children of a single
mother, in a black ghetto in Columbus, Ohio, in 1960. My
mother at times worked two jobs, but her wages were low,
she received no job benefits, and none of our fathers helped
her. We needed welfare-I cannot imagine what we would
have done without it. Even with it, my family went weeks
without regular meals at home. We ran out of food each
month, eating sugar or mayonnaise sandwiches until they too
ran out.
67. The following is an excerpt from FAiR, supra note 7, at xv-xvii, reprinted
with permission.
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Our housing was old and small, but rent in the ghetto was
high-priced. We occupied every square foot of space: bed-
rooms, the basement, and the attic. We never had individual
bedrooms and frequently shared beds. Our houses were poorly
insulated and frequently infested with roaches and rats. At
night, I remember sitting on the couch and being afraid to put
my feet on the floor fearing that a rat or mouse might scurry
across them. Our campaign against roaches was futile; they
were the permanent residents, we were the transients, moving
every couple of years in search of cheaper rent or when we
fell behind to the landlord.
Sometimes during the frigid, below-zero Ohio winters my
family had no gas heat. To stay warm, we huddled under blan-
kets and slept in our clothes. To bathe, we either took icy
showers or boiled pots of water on our single-burner, electric
hotplate. A few times my mother could not pay the electric
bill. I thought we were the poorest people in Columbus. Of
course, we were not.
I started hustling jobs when I was seven. For the next
eleven years, after school and on weekends, I ran errands,
shoveled snow, cut grass, cleared trash, cleaned bathrooms,
swept floors, cooked, stocked groceries, sold candy, and
cleaned animal cages. My survival depended on those jobs.
They enabled me to buy food, a few clothes, school supplies,
and to help my mother pay bills.
I attended elementary school regularly and earned ANs and
B's in most classes. However, when I participated in a volun-
tary busing program during junior high that moved black kids
from the ghetto into predominantly white schools, the work
seemed much harder and my grades declined. My reading
skills were inadequate and I struggled through homework. I
was only a C student.
When I started high school, one of my teachers told me
that I had an appealing personality, but that I didn't know very
much. He gave me history and literature books to read. I
couldn't comprehend them without constant searches through
the dictionary for words whose pronunciation and meaning I
didn't know. I was scared, angry, and felt trapped.
Many blacks in Columbus and elsewhere in the United
States are born into such conditions. Most remain there. I es-
caped. I attended Duke, then UCLA School of Law. I am not
poor nor dependent on welfare. Neither are any of my siblings.
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I support myself and help support my mother. How did this
happen? One important factor was remedial affirmative action.
No one can tell me that affirmative action does not work. It
did for me, as it has for many other Americans.
One motive for telling this story is to expose tales about
the hazards of affirmative action, whether the myth-making is
done by whites, blacks, or others; another is to make clear
that remedial affirmative action is not the same as the whites-
only, caste-producing legislation that has been so prevalent
throughout America's history. My life experiences persuade me
that remedial affirmative action and hard work, plus the sup-
port and direction of many people, best explain how, even
though the odds were decidedly against me, I got out of that
Ohio ghetto. Without those educational opportunities, I would
have been trapped by circumstances and conditions signifi-
cantly beyond my control.
CONCLUSION
For too long, the Court has read the Constitution to pro-
tect white privilege encapsulated in slavery, segregation, and
their present effects. One need only recall the candid language
of the first Justice Harlan, for a reminder that even sympa-
thetic justices have not always hidden their allegiance to racial
supremacy in theory and fact:
The White race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education,
in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not it will continue to be
for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds
fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in the view of
the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country
no superior, dominant ruling class of citizens. There is no caste
here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tol-
erates classes among citizens.8
The current Court majority's recent decisions threaten
even more harm, interpreting the Constitution now to allow
whites to defeat modem remedial policies that are only begin-
ning to show positive results, under standards far less rigorous
than those faced by plaintiffs of color who for centuries could
68. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 558 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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obtain no relief, no justice. We must illustrate the Court's
double standards at every turn.
America has never adopted any policies designed to pro-
mote white caste. No current remedial affirmative action pol-
icy has the invidious purpose or effect of excluding whites
from public accommodations, voting, employment, education,
or housing. They were enacted because of their remedial ef-
fect. Therefore, reverse discrimination is a bitter hoax.
As the great legal minds of the Twentieth century con-
quered the color-line, we must advance their work and dis-
mantle caste so that our children's children will not live lives
demeaned by color or caste. I hope that Southern University
Law Center will keep teaching its graduates about racial caste
and a sensitivity to other forms of caste as we try to reclaim
America's conscience.
Congratulations on the first fifty years. You have given
substance to the phrase "equal justice under law."
APPENDIX A




Wygant N Y N
Johnson N Y Y N
Paradise N Y N N
Creson N N N N N
Metro N Y N N N
DoweU N N N N N
Freeman N N N N N N
Shaw N Y N N N Y N
Adarand N Y N N N Y N Y Y
Miller N Y N N N Y N Y Y
Jenkins N Y N N N Y N Y Y
NOTE N -Vote Against Afimative Action
Y Vote For AffImative Action
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